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ABSTRACT
The most widely used technique for IP geolocation con-
sists in building a database to keep the mapping between
IP blocks and a geographic location. Several databases are
available and are frequently used by many services and web
sites in the Internet. Contrary to widespread belief, geolo-
cation databases are far from being as reliable as they claim.
In this paper, we conduct a comparison of several current
geolocation databases -both commercial and free- to have
an insight of the limitations in their usability.
First, the vast majority of entries in the databases refer
only to a few popular countries (e.g., U.S.). This creates
an imbalance in the representation of countries across the
IP blocks of the databases. Second, these entries do not re-
flect the original allocation of IP blocks, nor BGP announce-
ments. In addition, we quantify the accuracy of geolocation
databases on a large European ISP based on ground truth in-
formation. This is the first study using a ground truth show-
ing that the overly fine granularity of database entries makes
their accuracy worse, not better. Geolocation databases can
claim country-level accuracy, but certainly not city-level.
Categories and Subject Descriptors







With the emergence of Internet services requiring loca-
tion information, IP geolocation techniques (i.e., mapping
an IP address to the geographic location of the correspond-
ing host) becomes a key enabler for many of these services.
Examples of such services comprise targeted advertising on
web pages, displaying local events and regional weather, au-
tomatic selection of languages to first display content and
restricted content delivery following regional policies.
Two main paradigms exist to geolocate IP addresses: ac-
tive and passive. Active IP geolocation techniques, typically
based on delay measurements [1, 2, 3, 4], may achieve desir-
able properties such as accuracy (i.e., active measurements
provide better results compared to geolocation database in
many cases). However, these properties come at the expense
of lack of scalability, high measurement overhead, and very
high response time ranging from tens of seconds to several
minutes to localize a single IP address. This is several or-
ders of magnitude slower than what is achievable with the
passive approach, i.e., database-driven geolocation.
Database-driven geolocation usually consists of a database-
engine (e.g., SQL/MySQL) containing records for a range of
IP addresses, which are called blocks or prefixes. Geolocation
prefixes may span non-CIDR subsets of the address space,
and may span only a couple of IP addresses. Examples of
geolocation databases are GeoURL [5], the Net World Map
project [6], and are provided as free [7, 8, 9] or commercial
tools [10, 11, 12, 13, 14].
The other side of the coin with geolocation databases is
that, besides the difficulty to manage and update them,
their accuracy is more than questionable [15, 16], especially
due to lack of information about the methodology used to
build them. The crux of the problem is that prefixes within
databases are not clearly related to IP prefixes as advertised
in the routing system, nor to how those routing prefixes are
used by their owners (e.g., ISPs, enterprises, etc). Indeed,
even if many commercial geolocation databases claim to pro-
vide a sufficient geographic resolution, e.g., at the country-
level, their bias towards specific countries make us doubt
their ability to geolocate arbitrary end-hosts in the Inter-
net.
Few works focus on geolocation databases and their ac-
curacy. Freedman et al. studied the geographic locality
of IP prefixes based on active measurements [17]. Siwper-
sad et al. assessed the geographic resolution of geolocation
databases [16]. Based on active measurements, the authors
of [16, 17] showed the inaccuracies of geolocation databases
by pinpointing the natural geographic span of IP addresses
blocks.
In this paper, we go further by questioning the reliabil-
ity of the information contained in geolocation databases.
As the databases are expected to be able to correctly ge-
olocate IP addresses, we find a surprising low number of
unique geographic locations, tens of thousands, compared to
the large number of blocks (up to several millions) in many
databases. In addition, we observe that a few countries are
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over-represented in these databases, making the geographic
sampling of the databases not fairly spread across the world.
One of our findings is that these entries do not reflect the
address space of IP blocks as originally allocated to their
owners or as announced by BGP. Locations discrepancies
between the databases, coupled with the fine granularity of
their blocks, often /29, shed serious doubt on the accuracy
of their geolocation.
Finally, to confirm our doubts about the inability of databases
to provide city-level accuracy, we confront the geolocations
of three databases on the prefixes advertised by several large
ISPs, based on ground truth information. We find that most
of the blocks of the databases incorrectly geolocate prefixes,
with errors being systematically in the order of a few hun-
dreds of kilometers.1
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: Sec. 2
describes the geolocation databases we consider in this work;
Sec. 3 confronts three commercial databases with the net-
work of a large European ISP for which ground truth is
available; finally, Sec. 4 concludes this work.
2. DATABASES
Database Blocks (lat; long) Countries Cities
HostIP 8,892,291 33,680 238 23,700
IP2Location 6,709,973 17,183 240 13,690
InfoDB 3,539,029 169,209 237 98,143
Maxmind 3,562,204 203,255 244 175,035
Software77 99,134 227 225 0
Table 1: General characteristics of the studied ge-
olocation databases
In this paper, we consider five IP geolocation databases.
Two are commercial (Maxmind [14] and IP2Location [12])
and three are freely available (InfoDB [8], HostIP [7], and
Software77 [9]). Although these databases share some infor-
mation about their construction processes, comments about
how they are built are vague and technically evasive. As
reported in [8], InfoDB is, for instance, built upon the free
Maxmind database version, and incremented by the IANA
(Internet Assigned Numbers Authority) locality informa-
tion. The HostIP database is based on users’ contributions.
Finally, Software77 is managed by Webnet77, an enterprise
offering Web hosting solutions.
Typically, a geolocation database entry is composed of a
pair of values, corresponding to the integer representation
of the minimum and maximum address of a block. Each
block is then associated with several information helpful for
localization: country code, city, latitude and longitude, and
Zip code.
Table 1 shows the number of entries (i.e., the number
of IP blocks) recorded in each database (column labeled
“Blocks”). Most databases contain several millions of IP
blocks. Only Software77 has much less entries: 99, 134.
HostIP has the highest number of entries because it is com-
posed exclusively of /24 prefixes. Compared to the more
than 300, 000 prefixes advertised in BGP routing, one might
be led to believe that the geographic resolution of the ge-
olocation databases is much finer than the natural one from
BGP routing [17].
1An extended version of this work can be found in [18].
Figure 1: Countries distribution
Table 1 provides also the number of countries and cities
retrieved from the databases locations. From the number of
countries, we can infer that most of the world countries are
covered. However, containing blocks for most countries does
not imply that countries are properly sampled, neither from
an address space perspective nor from a geographic location
one. Fig. 1 shows the cumulative fraction of blocks from the
databases across countries. Note that countries on Fig. 1
(horizontal axis) have been alphabetically ordered based on
their ISO country codes.
Again, we stress the number of countries represented in all
databases that gives the impression that they cover fairly all
countries in the world. This is misleading as more than 45%
of the entries in these databases are concentrated in a single
country: the United States (see Fig. 1 for countries distribu-
tion of various databases used). The five databases display
a similar shape of their cumulative number of blocks across
countries. The big jump at country 235 corresponds to the
over-representation of the United States in terms of database
blocks compared to other countries. It is worth to no-
tice that countries distribution observed in whois database
(see Fig. 1) presents the same behavior than geolocation
databases.
From Table 1, we also notice the strong difference between
the number of IP blocks and the number of unique (latitude,
longitude) pairs. The perfect example of this is HostIP.
While it contains roughly 8 millions of IP blocks, those
blocks only refer to 33, 000 (latitude, longitude) pairs. This
observation casts some doubts upon the true geographic res-
olution of the databases.
Comparing the subnet size of database entries with those
from the official allocations by the Internet routing registries
and BGP routing tables is enlightening (see Fig. 2). HostIP
is not plotted as it is exclusively made of /24 prefixes. We
show results as for the period of February 2010, but it is
worth noticing that we observed similar results for other
periods in 2009.
Most allocated blocks and BGP prefixes are between /16
and /24. Very few allocations and BGP prefixes are sub-
nets smaller than 256 IP addresses (/24). BGP prefixes are
slightly more de-aggregated than the original allocations.
The Software77 database is made of entries that have the
same subnet size distribution as the original address space
allocation. 95.97% of the entries in Software77 correspond
to IP blocks as allocated in February 2010. As expected
from their sheer size, the other databases have a significant
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Figure 2: Prefix distribution
Exact Smaller Larger Partial
IP2Location 32,429 70,963 3,531 373
Maxmind 27,917 79,735 4,092 128
InfoDB 9,954 51,399 1,763 104
Table 2: Matching prefixes from an European ISP
against IP2Location, Maxmind and InfoDB
fraction of their blocks smaller than /24 subnets. These
databases split official address space allocations and BGP
prefixes into finer blocks.
Prefixes advertised by BGP and allocated blocks could,
however, constitute a first approximation to the databases
entries. Nevertheless, most of the IP blocks from Maxmind
and IP2Location correspond to subnets smaller than /25.
In essence, Maxmind and IP2location entries substantially
differ from BGP and official allocations by more than 50%
from a blocks size perspective. With such fine IP blocks,
we should expect a very high geographic accuracy. Again,
because the way these databases are built is kept secret, we
can only infer some of their characteristics. In particular,
from these first observations, all the studied databases, ex-
cept Software77, are clearly not related to official allocations
and BGP routing tables. Even if the entries would closely
match allocated or advertised prefixes, we would not expect
that the locations attributed to them in the databases would
be reliable. We believe this because the locations contained
in the databases do not have to be related to how address
space is actually allocated and used by its owners.
3. ISP GROUNDTRUTH
We extracted the complete routing table from a back-
bone router of a large European ISP. This dump contained
a total of about 380, 000 prefixes (both internal and exter-
nal). From these prefixes, those originated by the ISP were
extracted. This list was further trimmed down by drop-
ping all entries not advertised by the ISP to external net-
works. This leaves us with 357 BGP prefixes advertised by
the ISP and reachable from the global Internet that can be
matched against the databases. We call this set of prefixes
the ground truth set, since we have POP-level locations for
them.
Fig. 2 shows how the blocks of the three geolocation databases
match the prefixes of the ISP (ground truth set). Four out-
comes are possible for the match: Exact (the block is present
(a) exact match (b) subset match
Figure 3: Geolocation error of databases for large
ISP network with ground truth information
and the same), Smaller (the block is present but smaller in
the database), Larger (the block is present but larger in the
database), and Partial (the block from the database over-
laps with one prefix from the ground truth set).
The number of geolocation blocks that are smaller than
prefixes from the ISP is almost as large as the full set of pre-
fixes from ground truth set. Surprisingly, the databases also
have prefixes that match exactly those from ground truth set
in about 40% (IP2Location), 34% (Maxmind), and 12% (In-
foDB) of the cases. Databases therefore rely on the official
allocations and advertisements from the ISP, but also try
to split the blocks into more specific subsets for geolocation
purposes. Few blocks from the databases are bigger than
those advertised by the ISP or partially match one from the
ISP.
The next step is to extract the city-level position of the
routers advertising the subnets inside the ISP, giving us
ground truth about the actual location where the prefix is
being used by the ISP. To determine the exact location of
the prefix, we relied on a passive trace of all IGP messages
of one of the backbone routers of the ISP. Thanks to the
internal naming scheme of the ISP, we obtained GPS coor-
dinates of the PoP in which each backbone router lies, and
associated each prefix advertised on that router to the loca-
tion of the router. These coordinates for each prefix are our
ground truth used to assess the accuracy of the databases.
Fig. 3 shows the distribution of the distances between
the position reported by IGP and the one reported by the
databases, when looking at blocks of the databases that do
exactly match (Fig. 3(a)) or are smaller than prefixes adver-
tised by the ISP (Fig. 3(b)). The x-axis (in log-scale) gives
a distance (in Km) that we consider as an error from the
part of the databases, given the ground truth from the ISP.
A value of 10 on the x-axis, for instance, shows the fraction
of database prefixes that are less than 10Km away from the
ground truth.
From exact matches (Fig. 3(a)), we observe that Max-
mind and InfoDB have the same distance distribution to
the ground truth (both curves overlap). This is due to the
fact that InfoDB is based on the free version of the Maxmind
database. Less than 20% of the exact matches for Maxmind
and InfoDB are within a few tens of Km from the ground
truth. The rest of the blocks have errors distributed between
10Km and 800Km. Note that 800Km is the maximal dis-
tance in the country of the considered ISP. IP2Location has
much larger errors than Maxmind and InfoDB for the ex-
actly matching blocks, with errors ranging between 200Km
and 800Km.
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For databases blocks smaller than the ISP prefixes (Fig. 3(b)),
we observe two interesting behaviors. First, InfoDB and
Maxmind have different error distributions, with Maxmind
being actually worse than InfoDB. This is unexpected given
that InfoDB is based on the free version of Maxmind. The
explanation has to do with the commercial version of the
Maxmind database that splits the prefixes from the ISP into
very small blocks, many containing only eight IP addresses.
Splitting is intended to improve the accuracy of the geolo-
cation, but turns out to make geolocation worse given that
many small blocks have incorrect locations.
The second observation we make from Fig. 3(b) is the big
jump for IP2Location around an error of 400Km for about
50% of the blocks smaller than the ISP prefixes. By checking
those blocks, we notice that these belong to a few prefixes
from the ISP that are advertised but partly unused. These
large prefixes are currently advertised from a single location
in the ISP network. A large number of database blocks
consistently mislocate subsets of these prefixes.
We report the high success rates in providing the cor-
rect country of the considered IP blocks (between 96% and
98% depending on the database). We conclude that some
databases actually do a decent job at geolocating some of the
address space of the ISP. In most of the cases however, the
location given by the databases is off by several hundreds,
even thousands of kilometers. Furthermore, by trying to
split the address space into too small blocks, the databases
do make mistakes that are hard to detect unless one relies
on ground truth information from the ISP that owns the
address space. To conclude this section, we cannot trust the
databases for the ISP at the granularity of cities, especially
given large relative errors they make compared to the span
of the considered country (800Km). Their country-level in-
formation however seems globally accurate.
4. CONCLUSION
This paper questioned the reliability of several popular
geolocation databases. Given that these databases are fre-
quently used by many services and web sites in the Internet
and they do not provide much information about their infor-
mation sources, the quality of their geolocation information
should be checked.
Our findings indicate that geolocation databases often
successfully geolocate IP addresses at the country-level. How-
ever, their bias towards a few popular countries makes them
unusable as general-purpose geolocation services. Our re-
sults based on a ground truth information from a large Eu-
ropean ISP show that the databases perform poorly on the
address space of this ISP. One of the reasons we could iden-
tify for their poor geolocation abilities is the way databases
try to split prefixes advertised by the studied ISP into very
small blocks. Instead of improving the geolocation accu-
racy, significant errors are introduced for a large number of
blocks, especially at the city-level.
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